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Abstract: The article examines the influence of Aristotelian rhetorical theory on 
the epistemology of Newman. This influence is established on historical grounds 
and by similarity of content. Specifically, the article sheds light on how the 
rhetorical notions of ethos, logos, and pathos are all implicitly incorporated into 
Newman’s theory of knowledge concerning the concrete. The section on rhetori- 
cal ethos focuses on Newman’s appeal to the “prudent man.” Concerning logos, 
particular attention is paid to the rhetorical enthymeme and in what sense 
Newman’s method of argument (Informal and Natural Inference) can justiflably 
be described as enthymematic. Pathos, in turn, is shown to be significant for the 
way in which N e ^ a n  views foe subjective dimension of foe individual’s coming 
to knowledge. The rhetorical rationality that emerges sets the stage for claritying, 
in another context, other more theological themes in Newman’s writings, such as 
his religious apologetic, his understanding of tradition, and even his Christolo^f.
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1 Introducían
In his An Essay in theAid ofa Grammar ofAssent (1870), Newman tried to justity foe 
claim that believers without knowledge of arguments for their faith are never- 
tireless reasonable in assenting to that faith. Engaging foe rationalists and foe 
agnostics, Newman attempted to illustrate that even foe educated person’s faith 
does not ultimately rely on textbook syllogisms, but rather “on personal reasonings 
and implicit workings of the mind, which cannot be adequately put into words.”* 
Newman’s Cratorian confrère in Birmingham, Edward Caswall (1814-1878), sums 
up Newman’s intentions with his notes scribbled in his copy of the Grammar after a 
conversation with Newman: ‘Object of foe book twofold. In foe first part shows that 
you can believe what you cannot understand. In the second part that you can
1 Father Zeno, John Henry Newman: Our Way to Certitude. An Introduction to Newman’s Psycho-
logical Discovery: The Illative Sense, and his Grammar ofAssent (Leiden: E. ]. Brill, 1957), 11.
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believe what you cannot absolutely prove.”2 To this end, Newman’s Grammar 
elucidates three different kinds of reasoning or ‘Inference’: Formal, Informal, and 
Natural. Formal Inference is synonymous with deductive logic and can be reducible 
to syllogisms.^ The more subtle and complex kind of reasoning is Informal 
Inference, which involves a cumulation of probabilities, and whose terminus does 
not actually entail the conclusion (like a syllogism does), but rather points to it, just 
like a polygon that is inscribed in a circle tends ever closer to the ‘limit’ of the circle 
as the quantity of its sides increases.* Natural Inference, finally, is that kind of 
instinctual reasoning that relies most on first-hand experience, like the ‘weather- 
wise peasant’ who can predict foe weather without necessarily giving scientific 
reasons.^ There exists, according to Ncwmuu, a perfection of mind which enables 
foe individual to judge foe verity of the propositions that express foe conclusions of 
these various forms of Inference, many of which concern contingents or concrete 
realities. This virtue is the Illative Sense.
In order to more thoroughly understand Newman’s Illative Sense and how 
Newman conceives of foe mind’s capacity to judge and therefore acquire 
knowledge about concrete matters, it would be helpful to situate Newman’s 
thought not only in its historical, but also its philosophical context. Bearing in 
mind the multiple strands of philosophical influences running throughout 
Newman’s writings,^ we shall focus on the Aristotelian strand. In the end, 
exploring foe Aristotelian influence of the Rhetoric on Newman’s theory of 
judgment wifi serve to highlight a real, explicit, and central influence on 
Newman’s thought.7
2 Caswall quoted in Charles Dessain, John Henry Newman (Oxford, Oxford University Tress,
.148 , ر980ل
و G. A., 264. All references to Newman’s works refer to foe Longmans uniform edition unless 
otherwise noted and are abbreviated according to foe convention established by Joseph Rickaby’s 
Index 0 ؛ the Works ofjohn Henry Cardinal Newman (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1914).
4 G. A., 320-321.
6 Edward Slllem, The Philosophical Notebook 0J John Henry Newman, Volume 1, ed. Edward 
Sillem, 2 vols. (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1969-70). Hereafter, p. N., 1 and م . N., 11. The first volume is 
an introduction to Newman’s philosophical thought written by Sillem; the second volume is 
Newman’s notebook, edited by Sillem.
7 I am not examining Newman’s skills as a rhetorician, nor trying to point out foe rhetorical 
elements of foe works themselves. (W. Jost and E. Corbett have done this.) What is of relevance 
here is foe rhetorical (and in foe broader picture, dialectical) dimension of Newman’s conception 
٨۴ reason.
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2 Newman’$ appreciation of Aristotle and the 
Rhetoric
Newman’s first in-depth enceunter with Aristotle was as an undergraduate at 
Trinity College, Oxford. The Classics degree for which Newman studied, at the 
time, included Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric, and Poetics. Oxford itself 
was then under the influence of Richard Whately,® whose academic career there 
was characterized by, among other things, an attempt to restore the prominence 
of Aristotle in the Oxford curriculum^ Newman came under Whately’s influence 
when the former became a fellow at Oriel College in 1822 and, later, táce-principal 
of St. Alban Hall (under Whately) in 1825. Newman was very conscious of how 
very indebted to Whately he was.10 The extent and nature of Whately’s influence 
on Newman’s thought is increasingly being uncovered and clarified.11
This influence, however, was not unidirectional. There exists etádence to 
suggest that Newman might have had a hand in some of the passages of 
Whately’s own Elements ٠/ Rhetoric, just as he did in Whately’s Elements of 
Logic.12 Whether this is incontrovertible or not, it is indisputable that not only 
Whately’s Elements of Rhetoric, but Aristotle’s own Rhetoric was formative for 
Newman. Newman was not only familiar with, but, 1 argue, deeply imbued with
8 Richard Whately (1787-186 و) was a fellow at Oriel College, Oxford from 1811 to 1821. He was 
principal of St. Alban Hall in 1825 (at which time Newman was a fellow at Oriel), and made 
bishop of Dublin hr 1831. He was a leading figure among the “Oriel Noetics.” For more 
information on Whately, see Richard Brent, “Whately, Richard (1787-1863),” Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Fress, 2004); online edition, May 2006. 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29176]. Accessed 4 Dec 2013.
و See A. Dwight Culler, The Imperial Intellect: A study of Cardinal Newman’s Educational Ideal 
(New Haven: Yale University Fress, 1955), 39.
10 Apo. 111-119. Cf. Newman’s letter to Whately of 14 Novemberl826 (L. D., 1,307). Newman and 
Whately’s friendship cooled during the 1830’s due to theological and political differences.
11 See, for example, Geertjan Zuijdwegt, “Richard Whately’s Influence on John Henry Newman’s 
Oxford University Sermons on Faith and Reason (1839-1840),” Newman Studies Journal 10/1 
(2013): 82-95. Zuijdwegt brings to bear the relationship between antecedent probability and 
evidences on an understanding of faith as a kind of inference (or reason).
12 Ray E. McKerrow, ‘“Method of Composition’: Whately’s Earliest ‘Rhetoric,’” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 11 (1978): 43-58; Edward F.J. Corbett, “Some Rhetorical Lessons from John Henry 
Newman,” College Composition and Communication 31 (1980), 402-411, p. 402. There is no doubt 
that Newman was instrumental in the composition of Whately’s Elements of Logic (London: 
j. Mawman, 1827). See p. vi of the preface.
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Aristotle’s Rhetoric.13 Indeed, Edward Sillem writes that Newman “retained 
throughout his life a special affection for the Rhetoric.9914
The first signs of N em an’s reading Aristotle’s Rhetoric come in 1819. In 
December of that year, Newman writes to his sister, Jemima, that he has been 
studying “the beauties of the Rhetoric” and mentions a self-professed “proficiency 
in the lessons” of rite “great man” (Aristotle).^
Later, in 1823, as a fellow at Oriel, in a verse that Newman pens, again to 
Jemima, the Rhetoric features among those works which his best pupils read.^ One 
of Newman’s pupils, Thomas Mozley (1806-1893), in 1825, mentions how Whately’s 
*Rhetoric’ is preparatory to his study of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which his tutor, 
Newman, “strongly recommends.”^  Still later, in 1839, there is evidence of 
Newman having recommended Aristotle’s Rhetoric to w . H. Anderdon (1816-1890), 
who, apparently, was rather disappointed in it. Newman responded:
13 As a point of departure and a substantiation of my claims, I am indebted to the very helpful 
study by Walter Jost, Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina ?ress, 1989). Jost has argued that rhetorical reasoning mirrors informal reasoning (as 
dialectic follows formal reasoning). Further points of departure for Newman’s indebtedness to 
the Rhetoric include the second chapter in Angelo Bottone, The Philosophical Habit of Mind: 
Rhetoric and Person in John Henry Newman's Dublin Writings (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2 1 0 م ), esp. 
59-89. L. D., 11,264, where Newman mentions ethos as the determinant of practical matters; L. D., 
IV, 356, in a letter by Whately to Newman acknowledging that they “consulted together about so 
many practical measures and about almost all the principal points in my [his] publications”;/oftfl 
Henry Newman: Autobiographical Writings, ed. Henry Tristram (London: Sheed&Ward, 1956), 67: 
“It was a peculiarity of Whately to compose his books by the medium of other brains”; Franz 
Michel Wiliam, Die Erkenntnislehre Kardinal Newmans (Bergen-Enkheim bei Frankfurt: Verlag 
Gerhard Kaffke, 1969), 66-7.
14 P. N., 1,151. From now on, ‘rhetoric’, unless italicized, is always referring (not to foe text, but) 
to the art of rhetoric as conceived by Aristotle, using, as foe text for all subsequent quotations, 
foe w. Rhys Roberts translation found in The Rhetoric and the Poetics ٠/  Aristotle, with 
introduction by Edward F. ]٠ Corbett (New York: Random House, 1984).
15 From Newman to Jemima, 10 December 1819,1. D., 1,70. Cf. L. D., 1,64. Newman’s enthusiasm 
will wane, as he will put aside Aristotle’s Rhetoric, thereby relinquishing any chance that he had 
for a ‘first class’ mark, in order to focus on other subjects that demand his attention. He will 
ultimately receive only a ‘third class’ for his degree.
16 L. D.y 1,164 (19 May 1823).
17 L. D., 1,306n. Originally in Letters and Correspondence ofjohn HenryNewman DuringHisLife in 
the English Church, ed. Anne Mozley (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1903), 1,116. Mozley is 
most likely referring to some manuscript of, or foe actual copy of, Whately’s article, ‘Rhetoric’ in 
the Encyclopedia Metropolitana. This article, in turn, was further developed and published as 
Elements ofRhetoric (Oxford: ١. Farker, 1828).
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I recollect being very much disappointed when 1 first read it -  having heard a great deal of it 
-  and 1 could not bear it as an Undergraduate. 1 saw nothing in it (except the part about the 
passions ر -  But what 1 meant when 1 praised it, and what has grown on me about it is this, 
that it is a sort of analysis of one's ordinary thoughts, doings, plans etc. 1 mean there are 
more sayings, principles, τόποι and the like in one's common talk out of the Rhetoric than 
any other book.*e
Here, N e ^ a n  is articulating the practical dimension of the Rhetoric that appeals 
to him.
Finally, in 1874, Newman recalls that his reflections on the Logic and Rhetoric 
in his examination papers (as an examiner in Oxford) anticipated what he was 
arguing in foe Grammar}9 More will be said of the relationship between Aristotle 
and Newman’s epistemology below. Now, however, it is enough to note Newman’s 
familiarity and high regard for Aristotle and this particular text.
Not only does Newman explicitly cite texts from the Rhetoric, as he does, for 
example, when he summarizes and defends liberal education and l<nowledge,^ 
but he is also at home in foe technical language of Aristotelian rhetoric, as when 
Newman asserts that “an enthymeme fulfils foe requirements of what 1 have 
called Inference.”^  Our point-of-departure in this current article is a passage from 
one of Newman’s University Sermons:
Faith, then, as being a principle for foe multitude and for conduct, is influenced more by 
what (in language familiar to us of this place) are called εικότα [eikota] than by σημεία 
[sêmeia], -  less by evidence, more by ^eviously-entertained principles, views, and wishes.^
Eikota, commonly translated as Frobabilities, and Sêmeia9 translated as Signs or 
evidences, are staple concepts of Aristotelian rhetoric. These two dimensions 
roughly mirror Iwo out of Aristotle’s three main points of persuasion in the 
Rhetoric: ethos (foe moral and intellectual character of foe speaker), pathos (foe 
emotional state of foe hearers, but here expanded to foe general subjectivity of 
the individual), and logos (foe argument itself, including reasons and erôdences 
supplied in the persuasion). Eikota and Sêmeia correspond, roughly, to foe latter
18 L. D., Vll, 139 (9 September 1839).
19 L. D., XXVII, 80.
20 Idea, 109.
21 G. A., 263.
22 u. 5., 188. That Newman attaches these categories to Aristotle’s Rhetoric is beyond doubt, for 
in 1847, in his attempt to emphasize the Oxfordian’ (and, hence, pre-Catholic) character of the 
sermons, Newman, in his set of amendments to what would become the French translation of 
some of his University Sermons, points to fois very passage, writing, “p. 180 [188] εικότα vid. 
Aristotle's Rhetoric” (I. ٠., XII, 31).
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two, respectively. Ethos also has an important role to play in Newman’s thought, 
and corresponds to the epistemological weight Newman gives to the opinions of 
the ‘prudent man’. Hence, the following discussion will be divided into three 
sections1 ) ؛) a section on ethos which will briefly explore the Illative Sense’s 
relationship to the prudent man, especially regarding the issue of an inquiry; (2) a 
section on logos, or argumentation, which will explain the rhetorical element of 
the Illative Sense during the course of an inquiry; and finally (و ) a section on 
pathos which will discuss the Illative Sense’s acquisition of certain presupposi- 
tions or starting-points at the beginning of an inquiry. But before we delve into 
these three sections, a few general observations should be made about Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric and why Newman found its employment to be advantageous for what he 
was trying to achieve.
2.1 Rhetoric and the contingent, concrete, and Ecum stantial
At the outset, the most obvious, and perhaps most important, aspect of rhetoric 
that appeals to Newman is its concern with the concrete, or, in Aristotle’s words, 
its “observing in anygiven case the available means of persuasion.”^
Key to understanding how one reasons about concrete matters according to 
Aristotle is the distinction between the demonstrative and the dialectic.^* In the 
Prior and Posterior Analytics Aristotle treats the syllogism under its formal aspect 
(foe necessary connection between the conclusion and foe premises) and the 
material aspect (foe content and verity of the premises), respectively.^ Scientific 
demonstration occurs when foe matter of foe syllogism, or the premises, are 
certain, true, and primary (essential).^ Such a demonstrative syllogism gives one 
episteme, or scientific knowledge, or knowledge of a thing’s causes; the method is 
merely expository and deals with the necessary and invariable; foe typical 
example for fois kind of Aristotelian science is geometrical proof. When, however,
23 My emphasis. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355b 25.
24 Cf. Sister Miriam Joseph, The Trivium: The Liberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric: 
Understanding the Nature and Function ofLanguage, ed. Marguerite McGlinn (?hiladelphia: ?aul 
Dry Books, 2002), 226.
25 Sr. Joseph, The Trivium, 130-2. All quotations from the Organon are from The Works of 
Aristotle Translated into English, vol. 1, ed. w. D. Ross et al., 12 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University 
?ress, 1968).
26 Robin Smith, “Aristotle's Logie,” The Stanford Encyclopedia ٠/ Philosophy (Summer 2011 
Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, [encylopedia online]; http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/ 
entries/aristotle-logie/ [accessed 22 September 2011]; Sister Joseph, The Trivium, 226.
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the matter treated is net eertain knewledge, but opinion -  or when the matter 
(whieh is expressed in premises) is probable and contingent rather than certain 
and necessary, then dialectic is the method used.
In dialectic, there are multiple views on a given question which are reasonable 
and probable, but not inntrovertible.^ According to Aristotle, “Rhetoric is 
the counterpart of Dialectic.”*® Both dialectic and rhetoric are similar in that they 
treat of concrete, contingent questions to which the answers are not logically 
demonstrable. Historical judgments -  considered, here, as an ‘answer״ to a his- 
torical question -  for example, involve just such contingent subject matter (e. g., 
events shaped by decisions made by human person’s who, presumably, could 
have acted otherwise). Considering Newman as a historian helps explain, then, 
his predilection for intellectual instruments that deal with questions to which 
there is no necessary and demonstrable answer.^
Rhetoric, however, can be said to be, in a sense, ‘more concrete’ than dialectic 
simply due to its practical application. Rather than considering a philosophical 
question for its ٠١٨٠  sake in the form of a typical disputado, the rhetor aims for some 
action: either to accuse or defend, to praise or blame, or to exhort or dehort. This, of 
course, follows Aristotle’s scheme in the Rhetoric, according to which he classifies 
the various kinds of oratory: forensic (judicial) whose time province is the past, 
epideictic (demonstrative) whose time province is the present, and deliberative 
(political), whose time province is the future.^ Newman, in his illustrative exam- 
pies of Informal Inference, mimics this structure of Aristotle’s Rhetoric: “Let us take 
three instances belonging respectively to the present, foe past, and the future.”®* 
Just as foe art of rhetoric is employed for various purposes in conjunction with 
various time provinces, so the human mind thinks and employs its own methods 
according to tire particular work it sets out to do.
27 Aristotle treats dialectic chiefly in his Topics. See the brief summary 0 ؛ it in Sister Joseph, The 
Trivium, 226.
28 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1354a, 1.
29 Placing the Grammar9s main thrust thoroughly in the dialectical (as opposed to the scientific) 
realm is Newman’s quotation: “[...] so an intellectual question may strike two minds very 
differently, may awaken in them distinct associations, may be invested by them in contrary 
characteristics, and lead them to opposite conclusions; -  and so, again, a body of proof, or a line 
of argument, may produce a distinct, nay, a dissimilar effect, as addressed to one or to foe other” 
(G. A., 302).
30 Aristotle presents foe three kinds of oratory in Book 1, Chapter 3 and treats of them individ- 
ually in Chapters 8, 9, and 10.
31 G. A., 294. Newman then continues to show how Informal Inference is exercised in order to 
establish (1) that Great Britain is indeed an island (present), (2) that Virgil did indeed compose foe 
Aeneid (past), and (3) that we indeed shall die (future).
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The influence of the Rhetoric is also manifest in Newman’s constant use of forensic 
allusions in his writings, especially in the Grammar.32 Even in his notebook, he 
writes, “On the scientific method compared with what may be called the personal. 
It is analogous to the legal.”^  Investigation into a question is like a trial, and the 
individual’s mind is like a jury that has no choice but to judged
It ought not to be surprising that the scholar interested in historical questions 
and developments would also have an inclination toward oratory whose time 
province concerns the past. Newman’s discussion of foe range of the Illative 
Sense is full of historical examples and applications, such as when he describes 
the differing conclusions of historians,^ or his criticism of Gibbon,^ or foe need 
to be able to rule out certain absurd propositions in historiography, lest we 
prevent ourselves from moving the investigation forward.^
Some of Newman’s examples have a striking resemblance to Aristotle’s, both 
in terms of their content, and in terms of what the examples try to convey. 
Newman’s example of the consideration of the proposition, “We shall have a 
European war, for Greece is audaciously defying Turkey,” is one such example.^® 
In considering foe approach to such a statement, Newman is teasing out how 
concrete circumstances eschew foe imposition of the syllogism. N e ^ a n  high־ 
lights the irreducibly particular details ofthe case which are requisite to making a 
judgment about war, and shows that,
32 G. A., 323: “But there may he a cunsistency in a theory so variously tried and exemplified as to 
lead to belief in it, as reasonably as a witness in a court of law may, after a severe cross- 
examination, satisfy and assure judge, jury, and foe whole court, of his simple veracity.” On 
153-4 (184): “1 may find it my duty, for instance, after the opportunity of careful inquiry and 
inference, to assent to another’s inference, whom 1 have for years considered guilty.” On 256-258 
(324-326), Newman uses the example ofa murder trial. On 262 (332), Newman refers to the lawyer 
“who ‘would know, almost by instinct [...]’ that foe heroine was guilty” and foe “experts and 
detectives [...] in cases whether of foe civil or criminal law” exercising a “sagacity incomprehen- 
sible to ordinary men.” On 291 (372), Newman refers to “some great lawyer, judge or advocate, 
who is able in perplexed cases [...] to detect foe principle which rightly interprets fire riddle.”
33 P. N., II, 126.
34 See Walter Jost’s treatment of the relationship between logic and jurisprudence in lost. 
Rhetorical Thought in John Henry Newman, 94-95.
35 G. A., 363-371.
36 G. A., 373.
37 G. A., 376. Commenting on propositions such as “Noah has been considered foe patriarch of 
the Chinese people,” Newman writes, “These propositions, and many others of various kinds, we 
should think ourselves justified in passing over, if we were engaged in work on sacred history.”
38 G. A., 303-304.
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To draw a scientific conclusion, the argument must run somewhat in this way: -  ‘All 
audacious defiances 0 ؛ Turkey on the part of Greece must end in a European war; these 
present acts of Greece are such: ergo;’ -  where the major premises [sic] is more difficult to 
accept than the conclusion^ and the proof becomes an ‘obscurum per obscurius.’^
The example Gf war itself, in addition to the details one ought to consider and weigh, 
mirrors Aristotle’s treatment of war and peace in Book 1, Ch. 4 of the Rhetoric. 
Aristotle’s elucidation of all the details, facts, histories, and proclivities with which 
it behooves the political orator to familiarize h im self echoes Newman’s own 
method which entails determining “the particular case by its particular circum- 
stances.”** Furthermore, Aristotle himself, a few paragraphs prior to his discussion 
of war and peace, admits the same shortcoming of scientific demonstration with 
regard to human affairs؛ such as war:
But the more we try to make either dialectic or rhetoric not, what they really are, practical 
faculties, but sciences, the more we shall inadvertently be destroying their true nature; for 
we shall be re-fashioning them and shall be passing into fire region of sciences [42م.[م
2.2 The rhetorical Organon that transcends the scientific
Having illustrated tire non-contentious claim that rhetoric (being a counterpart to 
dialectic) is utilized in concrete circumstances, what is left to show is Newman’s 
pressing interest in the concrete and particular, which would thereby exhibit one 
dimension of his Aristotelian frame of mind. Newman, in fact, invokes the “heathen 
moralist”, Aristotle, when the former describes the unavoidable confronta tion  with 
concrete circumstances:
In truth, nothing Is more easy to the imagination than duty in the abstract, that is, duty in 
name and not in reality. It is when it assumes a definite and actual shape, when it comes 
upon us under circumstances (and it is obvious it can come in no other way), then it is 
difficult and troublesome. Circumstances are the vety trial of obedience.^
Concrete circumstances, for Newman, are the great determinants in one’s path 
to knowledge. The hearer’s or thinker’s situated-ness when making a concrete
40 Rhetoric, 1359b, 34-1360a, 11.
ءةةثءم
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judgment, the speaker’s sttuated-ness when proposing something or some 
thesis for another’s assent, and ultimately, foe situational character of history, 
its events, occurrences, tendencies, and fluxes and foe impact of these on other 
individuals, on other Christians, on Ecumenical Councils, and on foe Church’s 
tradition, are what concern Newman. The Rhetoric ofAristotle is the work which 
deals, more than others, with fois situational or circumstantial form of argu- 
mentation.
Many of Newman’s writings, such as “The Tamworth Reading Room”, seek 
out that which persuades, or that which convinces.44 And this, in turn, belongs 
more precisely to foe province of rhetoric. A look at Whately’s teaching in 
Elements ofRhetoric might be helpful here. There, Whately writes that reason- 
ing’s objectives are twofold: “Inferring,” and “Proving.” The former is “the 
ascertainment of the truth by investigation”; the latter “the establishment of it 
to foe satisfaction of another,” and foe latter, Whately asserts, belongs to foe 
province of rhetoric.^
So when Newman points out foe inadequacies of logic, by pleading for an 
“organon more delicate, versatile and elastic than verbal argumentation, ”ئ  
he is, in fact, echoing that which Whately contends when he sets rhetoric (or 
proof or establishing foe truth of something ٠؛  the satisfaction ofanother) apart 
from inference. Whately writes, “In explaining therefore, and establishing foe 
truth, he [the philosopher qua rhetor] may often have occasion for rules of a 
different kind from those employed in its discovery. ft is this distinction 
between inference and proof (assent) of Whately’s that sheds light on Newman’s 
remarks about logic: “Logic then does not really prove.”*® Logic provides a host
44 See for example, “The Tamwerth Reading Room” in Discussion and Arguments, 292-297.
45 Richard Whately, Elements ofRhetoric, و rd ed. (Oxford: Baxter for John Murray, 1830), 6-7. 
He continues, “and it was added, that to infer is to he regarded as the proper office 0 ؛ the 
?hilosopher, or foe Judge; -  to prove, of foe Advocate. It is not however to he understood that 
?hilosophical works are to he excluded from the class to which Rhetorical rules are applicable; 
for foe Rhifosopher who undertakes, by writing or speaking, to convey his notions to others, 
assumes, for the time being, foe character of Advocate of the doctrines he maintains [...] And in 
doing this, he will not always find it expedient to adhere to foe same course of reasoning by 
which his own discoveries were originally made; other arguments may occur to him afterwards, 
more clear, or more concise, or better adapted to the understanding of those he addresses. In 
explaining therefore, and establishing foe truth, he may often have occasion for rules of a 
different kind from those employed in its discovery.”
46 G. A., 271.
47 My emphasis. Whately, Elements ofRhetoric, 7.
48 G. A., 271.
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of other servtces,^ “but for genuine مم7م /  in concrete matter we require an 
organon more delicate, versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation.”^
The lines of distinction are drawn by both Newman and Whately between 
ascertainment, discovery, and -  properly so-called by Whately -  ‘Inference’, on 
the one hand, and establishing and proof, on the other. Newman simply takes 
this distinction made by Whately in the Elements and applies it, or rather, 
extends tire meaning of it, to serve his own purposes, all the while keeping the 
substantial meaning of the distinction intact. Where Whately contrasts Infer- 
ence with Proving, Newman invests a substantial portion of the Grammar in 
contrasting Inference with Assent. For Whately, tire crucial point of the dis- 
tinction lies in whether or not we are concerned with establishing something to 
the satisfaction of another person.51 In similar fashion, Newman’s Illative Sense 
is meant to determine at what point the Inferential evidences satisfy the mind, 
enabling the individual person to assent to a given proposition. Both Newman 
and Whately use the same word ‘Inference’ to denote the same meaning: 
argumentation in either its scientific (logically demonstrative) or contingent 
(dialectical) forms; they use different words. Proof and Assent, to denote, again, 
the same meaning: the point at which a person is satisfied with the evidence to 
the extent that he or she assents (or in rhetorical terms, is persuaded).^
It is my contention that Newman is using ‘organon’ here both in its general 
sense as an instrument for acquiring knowledge and in its more specific sense 
denoting Aristotle’s works on logic. Newman is contrasting the more ‘flexible’ 
organon with that of ‘verbal argumentation’ -  synonymous with Inference -  
whose scientific form is Logic.^ In concrete matters, Newman is exhorting us to
49 Newman continues to describe the tasks 0؛ logic on 217 (271): “It enables us to join issue with  
others; it suggests ideas; it opens views; it maps out for us the lines of thought; it verifies 
negatively; it determines when differences of opinion are hopeless; and when and how far 
conclusions are probable.”
50 Myemphasis. G. A., 271.
51 Cf. Idea٠ 415: “Aristotle, then, in his celebrated treatise on Rhetoric, makes the very essence of 
the Art lie in the precise recognition of a hearer. It is a relative art, and in that respect differs h־om 
Logic, which simply teaches the right use of reason, whereas Rhetoric is the art of persuasion, 
which implies a person who is to be persuaded.”
52 The similarity is only a material one and, hence, the two terms are not completely synony- 
mous. Newman would, for example, predicate ‘unconditional’ of Assent, but not of Proof.
53 The full quotation from G. A., 263-264: “Verbal reasoning, of whatever kind as opposed to 
mental, is what 1 mean by inference, which differs from logic only inasmuch as logic is its 
scientific form. And it will be more convenient here to use the two words indiscriminately, for 1 
shall say nothing about logic which does not in its substance also apply to inference.”
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move beyond the Aristotetian Organon to a more flexibte one.54 Newman’s call 
for a new ‘organon’ can be understood, not as a departure from, but as a result 
of, his acceptance of, and familiarity with, certain key elements of Aristotle and 
the classical tradition.^ That is to say, as will become clearer below, a sub- 
stantial portion of Newman’s answer to scientific minds such as William 
Froude^ and the liberals of the evidentialist school is to recover the classical 
Aristotelian distinctions between various forms of argument and apply them to 
the issues at hand. The scientific versus the dialectical is just such a distinction. 
Both kinds of argument have the potential to elicit in us the same, phenomeno- 
logically equivalent, certitude.و  The primary difference or even “imperfection” 
of the arguments dealing with the contingent “arise out ofits subject-matter and 
the nature of the case.”58 Much epistemological stagnancy can be avoided if we 
sufficiently differentiate between these two spheres. To do so requires that we 
refrain from approaching concrete questions with expectations of demonstrative 
resolution, when the best possible outcome is “moral certainty” that is achieved 
by way of dialectic or, more practically, rhetoric. Furthermore, we ought to 
appreciate, and appreciate by understanding better, the nature and capacity of 
that faculty of the human mind which is activated when confronted with 
concrete questions, i. e. the Illative Sense.
54 The Rhetoric is not included in fee Organon, or fee collection of Aristotle’s works on logic. 
(Though fee distinction between fee dialectical and demonstrative (i. e., scientific) is indeed 
present there, for example, in fee Topics).
55 Newman’s love for Cicero, as it manifested itself in the article written for the Encyclopedia 
Metropolitana, is one example of this. Cf. “Personal and Literary Character of Cicero,” in 
Historical Sketches /  (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901), 239-300.
56 William Proude (1810-1879), brother of historian, James Anthony, and leader of the Oxford 
Movement, Richard Hurrell. William was an engineer and naval architect. Be earned a first class 
in mathematics at Oxford (Oriel College) in 1831. Newman’s composition of his Grammar was in 
large part fee result of his ongoing correspondence with w. Proude on fee reasonableness of faith 
and certainty based on limited evidence. See Cardinal Newman and William Froude F. R. s.: A 
Correspondence, edited wife commentary by Gordon Huntington Harper (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1933).
57 Newman hints at this equivalence multiple times, this time, quoting from Vince, the Astrono- 
mer: “When these reasons, all upon different principles, are considered, they amount to a proof [...] 
which is as satisfactory to fee mind as fee most direct demonstration could be.” Again, “fee mind 
rests equally satisfied, as if the matter was strictly proved.” Quotation in G. A., 319.
58 G. A., 323.
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3 E th o s  and the judgment of the prudent man
In his Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses the idea nf the persuasive import of the rhetor’s 
character in Book I, Chapter 2 and more specificaliy in Book II, Chapter 1. In toe 
latter, he specifies what it takes for a man to possess ethos: it takes prudence 
(phronesis, or good sense), good moral character {arête or virtue), and goodwill 
(ieunoia). The good man -  toe man of ethos -  is well-intentioned, upright, and 
prudent. Aristotle writes something that Newman himself could have written 
(with toe help of Corbett’s English rendering of it):
We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally 
whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and 
opinions are divided.59
Where opinions are dhrided and certainty impossible is the realm of dialectic, 
which, as has been stated, treats of contingent and particular things. Now it is 
precisely these contingencies, such as historical questions or even the verity of 
particular doctrines, that concern Newman. To tackle them, Newman has implicit 
recourse to ethos by explicitly invoking the prudent man.^° Interestingly, for Cicero, 
who was also a key figure in Newman’s intellectual development, fire prudent man 
and the orator are “ideally toe same.”^
Because the Illative Sense’s capacity to judge concerning particulars has 
already been discussed above, what is left for us is merely to unpack toe 
importance Newman attaches to what he calls toe judicium prudentis viri.62 The 
prudent man’s mind is characterized by a “practical expertness” which equips
59 Rhetoric, 1356a, 6-9. Cf. Idea, 408: “Hence it is that the great philnsopher هء  antiquity, in 
speaking, in his Treatise on Rhetoric, of toe various kinds of persuasives, which are available in 
toe Art, considers toe most authoritative of these to be that which is drawn from personal traits of 
an ethical nature evident in the orator; for such matters are cognizable by all men, and the 
common sense of the world decides that it is safer, where it is possible, to commit oneself to toe 
judgment of men of character than to any considerations addressed merely to toe feelings or to 
toe reason.” See also Idea, 329: “Orators and preachers are by their very profession known 
persons, and toe personal is laid down by the Philosopher of antiquity as toe source of their 
greatest persuasiveness.”
60 For Aristotle, the ethos of toe orator comes through during the oration. Here, we interpret 
ethos more generally so as to include, for example, toe reputation of one enjoyed prior to 
another’s encounter with him or her.
6ل Victoria Ann Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1985), 35. For Newman’s indebtedness to Cicero, see Bottone, The Philosophical 
HabitofMind, 89-102.
62 G. A., 317; 383.
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him هآ  her ط  he more likely to attain the correct conclusion than another who is a 
novice to the subject matter.^ This becomes increasingly true the more abstruse 
the subject matter. The Latin axiom Cuique in arte sua credendum es؛ [Each person 
in his or her own art or skill must be believed] is one of Newman’s favorites.^ 
The pedagogically minded Newman is also aware of the highly personal 
element in transmitting ideas. Newman’s insistence on the virtues of the tutorial 
system is based on the conviction that personal contact is indispensable to the 
pupil’s holistic learning and development. Newman’s exposition of his educa- 
tional ideal reveals his concurrence with the “Philosopher of antiquity” according 
to whom the “personal” is the source of “greatest persuasiveness.”^
Although an individual’s probity is not emphasized by Newman in the 
Grammar, it is nevertheless present in other writings.^ Holiness, Newman vows, 
is “irresistible” in persuasion. So important is a person’s character that Aristotle 
goes so far as to describe it as that which can induce us to believe something 
without having heard any argument.^ The concern here is the validity of 
arguments from authority. Of course, it is preferable to consult one’s own self, 
provided one has the necessary acumen to judge of some matter; but excepting 
this, we turn to one who has what we lack: namely, experience in the subject 
matter. The two options arc ultimately the same, tire second simply being a morc 
indirect variation on the first.
We judge for urselves, by our own lights, and on our own principles; and our criterion of 
trnth is not so much the manipulation of propositions, as the intellectual and moral 
character of foe person maintaining them, and the ultimate silent effect of his arguments 
or conclusions upon our minds.^
4 Logos س  foe course ٠۴ an inq^ry
In the section describing the Illative Sense in action during the course of an 
inquiry, one is struck by the brevity of this section relative to the others which 
treat of the start and issue of tire inquiry. Moreover, Newman says little about
63TheTheologicalPapersofJohnHenryNewmanonFaithandCertainty,ed.HugoM.deAchava\, 
١. Derek Holmes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 22. Hereafter, T. p.
64 He quotes this (or some variation of ft) in T. p., 22; G. A.f 341; Idea, 6; Ess. 1, 230; 11, 40.
65 Idea, 329.
66 Cf. u. S., 92-95, on foe “beauty and majesty of virtue.”
67 Rhetoric, 1378a, 7-8.
68 G. A , 302.
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the eourse of an inquiry as sueh; rather, he chooses to illustrate its constituent 
elements through the example of a Espute among various scholars regarding 
their historical assessments of pre-historic Greece. Newman chooses to illustrate 
these elements by example rather than by systematically pin-pointing specific 
ones and analyzing them because Newman’s entire theory of implicit reasoning 
would be undermined if he were to scientifically account for elements or factors 
affecting the arrangement, analysis, and assessment of premises in concrete 
situations. All that we find explicitly articulated by Newman are elements 
described variously as “assumptions spontaneously issuing out of the state of 
thought,”^  “tacit understandings,” “vague and impalpable notions of ‘reason- 
ableness’,”™ “critical feeling,” “antecedent masoning,” “absolute persua- 
sion,”^  and “starting-points” and “collateral aids, not formally proved, but 
more or less assumed.”^  At the root of these psycho-ratiocinative factors is the 
highly personal dimension of reasoning which Newman seeks to uncover. 
Emphatically, Newman insists on foe human mind -  not an external rule, or 
logical modes and figures -  that directs foe course of an argument. Throughout 
an inquiry, there are too many factors and considerations; too many aspects 
under which things can, should, or maybe should not even be considered; 
different memories which serve to either confirm or call into question other 
bits of evidence; numerous principles, many of which are held unconsciously, 
some of which determine, for example, what does and does not count as 
evidence. No logic exists which is able to wade through the complexities conco- 
mitant with inquiries into certain concrete subjects. Rather, it is only foe living 
mind that can handle, collate, and process ever^rthing with which foe human 
person is confronted, and this is done with the help of an “intellectual instru- 
ment far too subtle and spiritual to be scientific.’’^  Newman’s Implicit reason- 
ing or Informal Inference can be regarded as rhetorical,™ then, in foe sense that 
Newman takes seriously Aristotle’s insight, that most men “cannot take in at a 
glance a complicated argument, or follow a long chain of reasoning.”™ What 
can be interpreted as an expression of elitism in foe case of Aristotle is, for 
Newman, an observation about foe nature of the thinking process which 
actually shows the versatility and agility of foe human mind؛ namely, that
69 G. A., 364.
70 0. A., 367.
71 G. A., 368.
72 G. A., 371.
74 Cf. Walter Jost, Rhetorical Thought, Chapter 3.
75 Rhetoric, 1357a 3-4.
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despite these limitations, the mind is capable of coming to lcnowledge about 
concrete things through subtle and variegated processes of thought.
4.1 l$ Newman’$ Informal reasoning enthymematic?
Dwight Lindley has recently suggested, in taking forward the thesis that Newman’s 
Informal and Natural Inferences mirror rhetorical reasoning, that the kind of 
reasoning methods Newman imparts is rhetorical in the sense that it is enthyme- 
matic. Lindley writes:
All speakers, according to Aristotle, communicate via enthymeme, leaving some or many 
of the premises out of each logical segment of their arguments. This means that rhetoric is 
de facto presumptive, taking many details of every situation for granted as tacit premises 
as it moves forward to draw subsequent conclusions. In Newman’s epistemolo^, these 
unspoken premises come to stand for all the countless data of implicit reason, the 
antecedent probabilities for h e  persons, places, and ideas involved in h e  present 
situation. The complex network ofimplicit reason is, forNewman, the great tacitpremise ٠/  
all the enthymemes ofour lives, undergirding every attempt we make at communication. Our 
explicit reason is in every case enthymematic, seeking ٠؛  carry in ‘the body ofrhetoric’ all the 
fullness ofour experience ofreality.”76
This insightful asserticn, no doubt, provides much food for thought. But we ought 
to reexamine whether or not Newman’s Informal and Natural Inferences merit the 
title enthymematic.77
4.2 Enthymematic reasoning: similarities with Newman’s 
Informal Inference
Though much is still disputed about h e  exact nature of the enthymeme, what is 
clear is that the enthymeme is the rhetorical counterpart to h e  scientific and 
dialectical syllogism. Classically, h e  enthymeme has often been described as a 
syllogism in which one premise is lacking or taken for granted, thereby allowing a
76 My emphasis. Dwight Lindley III, “?rebability and Economy in Newman’s Theory of 
Knowledge,” Newman Studies Journal 7/1 (2010): 20-28, 2a.
77 Lindley is correct to emphasize tire existence of implicit premises that are active despite their 
not always being on the conscious level. The question posed, here, however, is whether or not 
٠enthymematic’ is h e  best descriptor of Newman’s Informal (and Natural) Inference.
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more swift traversai from premise to conciusion/® Although this charaeterization of 
the distinguishing mark of the enthymeme is still disputed/* one ean assert that 
this way of syllogizing, nonetheless, is oftentimes more effeetive in speeeh because 
ft does not impose the burden for the listeners to follow, and risk getting lost in, 
unnecessary premises؟ furthermore, the more that is left unsaid, and hence, given 
an aura of acceptability, the more fluid and natural tire reasoning process appears 
from the hearer’s point־of־view. In short, some things are better left unsaid.®° Of 
course, the critic may rightfully object to the manipulative character of such 
selective omissions. But such an interpretation of rhetorical theory as manipula- 
tive, perhaps rightfully attributed to Aristotle,®* need not and ought not to be 
applied to Newman. For toe ultimate reason why some things, aspects, premises, 
and considerations should be left unsaid when arguing is because many of them 
simply cannot be articulated to anyone’s satisfaction by virtue of their being “too 
multiform, subtle, omnigenous” and “too implicit.” Few minds, if any, can keep a 
multitude of verbalized premises before them. This is, undoubtedly, what Newman 
attempts to overcome when he says that verbal argumentation must be subordinate 
to a “higher logic.”82 Such is the implication when one observes, as shrewdly as
78 Such an interpretatinn takes the Rhetoric 1357a 17-19 as its starting p©int: “The enthymeme 
must c©nsist ©f few pr©p©siti©ns, fewer ©ften than th©se which make up toe normal syll©gism. 
F©r it any هء  these pr©p©siti©ns is a familiar fact, there is no need even to mention it؟ toe hearer 
adds it himself.” Even Sister Miriam J©seph has accepted this definition. Cf. Sister J©seph, The 
Trivium, 138-139.
79 The safer and, in my opinion, more correct interpretation is to accept Aristotle’s definiti©n of 
the enthymeme in toe Analytica Priora, 11, 27, which says nothing ab©ut missing premises but 
simply defines it as a syllogism starting fr©m probabilities or signs (70a 9-10). Following this 
line, toe definition would then be presupposed in toe Rhetoric. For a more detailed analysis of the 
current debates surrounding toe precise nature of toe enthymeme, see Ant©ine c. Braet, “The 
Enthymeme in Aristotle’s Rhet©ric: From Argumentati©n Theory to L©gic,” Informal Logic 19, No. 
2 & 3 (1999): 101-117. Cf. William T. Farryand Edward A. Hacker, Aristotelian Logic (Albany: State 
University ٠٤ New York Fress, 1991), 359 nl.
8م  Newman echoes this idea when he continues, “ft is this which was meant by the Judge who, 
when asked for his advice by a friend, on his being called to imp©rtant duties which were new to 
him, bade him always lay down the law boldly, but never give his reasons, for his decision was 
likely to be right, but his reasons sure to be unsatisfactory.” G. A., 303.
81 “It is this simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when 
addressing popular audiences [...] Educated men lay down broad general principles؟ uneducated 
men argue from common knowledge and drew obvious conclusions” (Rhetoric 1395b 28-29); “We 
assume an audience of untrained thinkers” (1357a 12-13).
82 G. A., 303.
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Newman does, the ultimate iimitations of language with regard to thought, 
however useful language is.83
Now, according to the classical Aristotelian enthymeme, toe unsaid premise 
can he filled in, at least theoretically.®* Does this disqualify Informal and 
Natural Inferences from being enthymematic? No, simply because omissions of 
premises due to toe overwhelmed, over-stretched, and fatigued mind does not 
mean that one categorically cannot articulate toe implicit premises when the 
individual is pressed or prompted to do so. Like Aristotle’s enthymemes, then, 
Newman’s Informal and Natural Inferences contain premises that are proponi- 
ble, even if, on a practical level, they burden toe argument, are deemed 
unnecessary: or are simply unconsidered.^
4.3 enthymematic rea$ening: a m ajo  difference from 
Newman’s informal Inference
On the level of an argument’s essential structure, however, describing 
Newman’s Informal and Natural modes of argument as enth^em atic can be 
misleading. It is misleading because such an assertion ignores the syllogistic 
form of an enthymeme and instead focuses on toe omission of premises. 
Newman’s Informal and Natural Inferences, however, are qualitatively different 
modes of argument from the enthymematic sylfogism.®  ^ Newman himself
83 G. A., 284: “Th^ght is too keen and manifold, its sources are too remote and hidden, its path 
too personal, delicate, and circuitous, its subject-matter too various and intricate, to admit of the 
trammels of any language, of whatever subtlety and of whatever compass.”
84 An example from Rhetoric 1394 4-6. “There is no man among us all is free. For all are slaves 
of money or of chance.” The missing premise is “Slaves are not free.”
85 Γ. 22 ,.م : “Another condition of a science is that its premises should be fow, whereas in the 
evidentia credibilitatis, there are so many as not to admit of convenient exhibition; Think how 
many propositions it has taken to arrive even at number 12. immediately above! for this reason 
again the evidentia credibilitatis does not admit of scientific treatment.” The “number 12” to 
which Newman refers is the twelfth in a series of propositions aiming to show how evidence of 
contingent truths is logical, but not scientific.
86 “Fnthymematic syllogism” is actually redundant. 1 use it for rhetorical emphasis!
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associated with the deductive syllogism, albeit in its rhetorical
form.87 This is true to Aristotle.ee
By mentioning the enthymeme in toe chapter discussing Formal Inference, 
Newman sets it apart from Informal reasoning. Informal Inference includes 
inductive arguments such as cumulative and analogical arguments. Inductive, 
here, simply means arguing from particulars. The rhetorical version of inductive 
reasoning is, according to Aristotle, toe example, which he sets in contrast ٠؛  toe 
enthymeme because the latter is deductive.89 Hence, when Lindley writes, “All 
speakers, according to Aristotle, communicate via enthymeme,” he simply omits 
Aristotle’s crucial addition, ((or examples."90
There’s no question that, for Aristotle, as for his followers, such as Whately, 
and even for Newman, toe deductive syllogism (and by implication, the rhetorical 
enthymeme) had a cettain pride of place over toe inductive example.** But given a 
certain concrete case, Ne™ an tries to show that imposing a syllogism, even an 
enthymematic one, becomes nugatory.92 Newman’s example of applying a syllo­
87 G. A., 263: “An enthymeme fulfils the requirements uf what 1 have called Inference. So does 
any other form of words with toe mere grammatical expressions, ‘for,’ ‘therefore,’ ‘supposing,’ 
‘so that,’ ‘similarly,’ and toe like. Verbal reasoning, of whatever kind, as opposed to mental, is 
what I mean by inference, which differs from logic only inasmuch as logic is its scientific form. 
And it will be more convenient here to sue toe two words indiscriminately, for 1 shall say nothing 
about logic which does not in its substance also apply to inference.”
88 Rhetoric 1356b 2-10; 1394a 25-27. The Rhetoric schematizes argument such that what toe 
syllogism is in dialectic, toe enthymeme is in rhetoric. What induction is to dialectic, example is 
in rhetoric.
هو  Rhetoric 1356b 3-8: “The example is an induction, toe enthymeme is a syllogism [...] I call toe 
enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and toe example a rhetorical induction. Everyone who effects 
persuasion through proof does in fact use either enth^mremes or examples: there is no other 
way.”
وو The passage that Lindley refers to, but cites only partially, is Rhetoric, 1356b 5-7. The full text 
is: “Every one who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or 
examples: there is no other way.”
1و Although Aristotle admits toe effectiveness ofboth, he writes: “Speeches that rely on examples 
are as persuasive as toe other kind [enthymematic] but those which rely on enthymemes excite toe 
louder applause” (Rhetoric, 1356b 24). Be also writes that we should have recourse to example only 
if we cannot argue by enthymeme, implying that examples work best when they supply evidence 
after toe enthymeme (1394a 9-17).
2و G. A., 284.
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gism to the argument, “We shall have a European war, for Greece Is audaciously 
defying Turkey,” is a a e ־in־point.^
As Newman continually sets aside the Formal argumentations he finds inade- 
quate, and describes the subtleties of a “higher” logic, the picture becomes clearer. 
Newman has in mind a mode of argument, a method of reasoning, which tran- 
scends the deductive approach that entails generalizations (or universals) being 
applied to particulars, ^ultaneously, however, Newman asserts that Informal 
(and by entailment. Natural) Inference has a logical form, despite the fact that it 
eludes the syllogism. N em an’s proof by converging probabilities is the paradig־ 
matic example of Informal Inference. Jost summarizes it well and helpfully points 
out that such a reasoning process is neither deductive, nor inductive:
When Newman speaks ه £ proof by converging probabilities, he seems to have in mind foe 
sort of ar^ment that helps us conclude that our house has been burglarized on foe basis of 
an open door, a chair out of place [...]. On analysis these signs do not provide foe minor 
premises for five independent syllogisms; Mill denied that we reasoned that way, and so did 
Newman. But it is also clear that these facts do not lead to an inductive generalization about 
a class; we have rather converging proofs leading to a singular [...]. Newman compared it 
[the convergence] to a cable or rod.94
وو This is afortiriori foe case when we consider those concrete cases in which personal agents 
endowed with free wills are involved. One of foe main arguments justifying the liberal arts in 
The Idea of a University is foe requisite recognition that human agency plays a role in both 
history and temporal affairs, generally. Cf. Idea, 53-57. It is useful to keep this in mind when 
confronted with what can seem to be a puzzling move on Newman’s part, such as when he 
lumps abstractions together with generalizations, putting on the same level, ‘All men are 
rational,’ and ‘All men have their price.’ The probable and contingent character of foe latter is 
put on equal footing with foe former proposition that has been traditionally interpreted as 
categorical. Newman’s practical bent is evident here. Interestingly, two of Newman’s examples 
suggesting his reluctance toward accepting categorical propositions -  ‘All men die; (but what 
of Elias?)’ and ‘All men have their price; (but what of Fabricius?)’ -  are both noted exceptions to 
foe “uniformity of causation” principle on which all categorical propositions are based: it is not 
applicable to a being with free wifi; hence, no one can categorically state, A ll men have their 
price’. Furthermore, foe principle “requires foe normal concurrence of the First Cause. Thus 
miracles represent a deviation from foe uniformity of nature, attributable to foe free will of foe 
Firat Cause.” Hence, Elias need not die like all other men. For these exceptions, see Sister 
Miriam Joseph, The Trivium, 216.
4و Jost, Rhetorical Thought, 96.
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4.4 Newman’s Informal Inference and erdinary Sign 
enthymemes
It Is my contention that it is Aristotle’s Ordinary (fallible) Sign enthymeme -  an 
enthymeme which is not a syllogism, properly speaking -  which provides a model 
for Newman’s cumulative argument, or an argument by the accumulation of 
evidences.^ Newman wishes to indicate those modes of argument which elude 
the grasp of the deductive syllogism. Enthymemes, too, are, strictly speaking, 
deductive -  moving from wholes to parts -  even if their premises are only 
contingent. The Ordinary Sign erthymeme, however, is exceptional in the sense 
that it is formally not syllogistic, but is nonetheless discussed under the heading 
of enthymeme by Aristotle. Let us take a closer look.
According to Aristotle there are two main kinds of oratorical argument: 
argument by example (inductive) and argument by enthymeme (deductive).^ The 
enthymeme, further, is divided between those that are based on ?robabilities 
(eikos) and those on Signs csemêia).97 The Signs, in turn, can be either fallible or 
irtiallible.*® Aristotle’s examples of an Infallible Sign enthymeme are, “The fact that 
he has a fever is a sign that he is ill,” or “The fact that she is giving milk is a sign 
that she has lately born a child.”99 This kind of enthymeme, or “complete proof’ 
(1tekmerion), where the conclusion necessarily follows if the premises are true, is 
irrefutable and hence, according to Aristotle, forms a valid deductive syllogism. 
Both ?robable and Infallible Sign enthymemes have this in common: the conclu-
وآل Jest is not explicit about this thesis. Be does, however, associate cumulative arguments with 
Signs, generaily, as he does in foe passage cited (96).
96 Rhetoric, 1393a 20-24. In Book 1J, Chapter 25, Aristotle extends this classification: Enthyme- 
mes based upon (1) ?robabilities are those which argue from what is, or is supposed to be, 
usually true. Enthymemes based upon (2) Examples are those which proceed by induction from 
one or more similar cases, arrive at a general proposition, and then argue deductively to a 
particular inference. Enthymemes based upon (3) Infallible Signs are those which argue from the 
ineritable and invariable. Enthymemes based upon (4) ordinary Signs are those which argue 
from some universal or particular proposition, true or false (1402b 14-21).
97 Rhetoric, 1357a 33-34. On Signs, see Analytica Priora, 11, 27. “A sign means a demonstrative 
proposition necessary or generally approved: for anything such that when it is another thing is, 
or when it has come into being foe other has come into being before or after, is a sign of foe 
other’s being or having come into being (70a 5-9).
98 Whately, in his Elements ofRhetoric, describes foe distinction between these two kinds of Signs 
as those which are erases of the evident signs, and those which are mere conditions of the evident 
signs. The former yield demonstrations; the latter probabilities. Cf. Elements 50 , ء’مما؛مسء .
99 Rhetoric, 1357b 14-16.
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sion (whether probate or not) necessarily follows the promises, so long as the 
premises are true or accepted.*°°
This is not the case, however, with fallible or what Aristotle calls Ordinary 
Sign enthymemes. Again, Aristotle’s example is: “The fact that he breathes fast 
is a sign that he has a fever.”*™ The argument is not a syllogism, nor can it be 
fashioned into one without a great deal of verbal dexterity which would, in any 
case, result in a formally invalid argum ent.^ And yet, such a proposition, 
though formally invalid, is not س  reasoning. In fact, one may even say that it is 
very good reasoning. Moreover, the fact that Aristotle includes this form of 
enth^nneme when treating of it seems to indicate that, although Aristotle 
recognized that Ordinary (non-necessary, fallible) Sign enth^miemes cannot be 
put into valid logical form, they can, nonetheless, be persuasive and hence, 
need not carry with themselves a negative and deceptive connotation. In fact, it 
can be said that non-necessary Signs are not only popular, but commonly 
accepted ways of arguing and reasoning. Jurisprudence and medical diagnoses 
are two such instances of Sign reasoning and Newman uses both examples in 
the Grammar}03
Such a method of reasoning in terms of Ordinary Signs, when multiplied, is 
what Newman calls a proof by converging probability.^ If one understands what 
Aristotle means by the Ordinary Sign enthymeme, then the meaning of Nevmran’s 
descriptions of Informal Inference become contextualized and clarified. They, like 
Ordinary Signs, are “cases, in which evidence, not sufficient for a scientific proof, is 
nevertheless sufficient for assent.”*^ riere, Newman implies that the kind of
roo The necessity here refers to the nature 01 the relationship between conclusion and premise; 
the contingent (probable) nature of the conclusion itself still stands. In other words, its form is 
syllogistic (necessary); its matter probable (contingent).
101 Rhetoric, 1357b 17-20. In the Analytica Priora, he gives foe example, “A woman is with child 
because she is pale” (70a 20-21).
102 Aristotle takes this kind of Sign and says of it, “But the syllogism which proceeds through 
foe middle figure is always refutable in any case: for a syllogism can never be formed when foe 
terms are related In fois way: for though a woman with child is pale, and this woman also is pale, 
it is not necessary that she should be with child” (Analytica Priora, 70a 33-40). The middle figure, 
in this context, is Figure u, in which the middle term is the predicate of both premises. One could 
put it into foe following form: “Those who have fever breathe fast. Feter breathes fast. Ergo
But such an argument is formally invalid by the undistributed middle.
1 6 مو . A., 324-328; 332.
104 G. A., 320-321.
105 G. A., 316.
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argument seught is one whose premises are unscientific,^ that is, contingent. The 
Ordinary Sign enthymeme’s are of this sort. Newman again: “Converging proba- 
bilities [...] constitute a real, [...] reasonable, not an argumentative, proof.”*^ The 
probabilities’ convergence is deemed by Newman to be non-argumentative because 
they are not syllogistic. Neither are the Ordinary Sign enthymeme’s. Again 
Newman: “We have arrived at these conclusions [Informal Inferences] not ex opere 
operato, by a scientific necessity independent of ourselves.”™® The conclusion 
inferred from the Ordinary Sign enthymeme too is not necessary. That is to say, 
nothing in the relationship between its premises -  or the form tire two take together 
-  compels any movement to a conclusion. Instead, the derivation of tire conclusion 
relies on the interpretation of, or the ‘reading’ of, the two (or more) premises (or 
evidences) by the human mind. The human mind, not the structure of the argu- 
ment, is indexical. The individual is “guided by the implicit processes of the 
reasoning faculty,”™* not by an assemblage of arguments and syllogisms. As a 
result, an individual’s experience and the shrewd mind have the upper hand over 
against the Formal syllogism. Formal Inference (including the enthymeme؟) cannot 
stomach such a mode of reasoning, and hence exhorts: “Let every prompting of the 
intellect be ignored, every momentum of argument be disowned [...]. Let the 
authority of nature, common-sense, experience, genius, go for nothing.”*™ Conver- 
sety, it is the prompting of the intellect, common sense, and experience which 
effectively contribute to tire success of Ordinary Sign enth^mremes.
We can say, then, that Newman’s Informal Inference guided by the Illative 
Sense shares characteristics of the enthymeme generally understood, in the first 
place, because both are invoked to address primarily questions of a contingent 
and, hence, probable nature. Moreover, both enthymemes and Newman’s Infor- 
mal Inference allow for unarticulated, but nevertheless proponible, premises. 
More specifically, however, Newman’s proof by converging probabilities is in 
substance identical -  not to the Aristotle’s more general understanding of the 
enthymeme, but to a particular version of the exceptional Ordinary Sign enthy- 
meme.
106 Evidence sufficient for scientific proof means premises which are, according to Sister Miriam 
Joseph, “true, essential and certain,” (Trivium, 226) or, according to Aristotle, “hue, primary, 
immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further related to them as 
effect to cause” (Analytica Posteriora, 71b 20-24).
107 G. A., 327.
108 G. A., 318.
1مو  G. A., 310.
110 G. A., 263.
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4.5 Summary
The nen-necessary Ordinary (faiiible) Sign enth^em e, when the signs are 
multiplied, is the prime model for Newman’s proof hy converging probabilities. 
In this light, Informal Inference takes on a concrete Aristotelian rhetorical cha- 
racter. Closer to home, converging probabilities, seen as a proof, is also expressed 
in Whately’s Elements of Rhetoric, in much the same way as Newman himself 
articulates it.111 In fact, it is in Whately’s book that we find the discussion of 
cumulative probability discussed in the same section as the Signs.^ The impor- 
tance of tire Informal kind of reasoning being enthymematic is foe fact that, on 
foe one hand, it exhibits a genus of argumentation that eludes the syllogism, 
while, on the other hand, it garners for itself an air of reasonableness, since it, 
among other reasons, is propounded by Aristotle as a real method of persuasion. 
The inclusion of such a method in foe Rhetoric, though not justifying foe method 
as such, at least makes the more general claim that it is persuasive precisely 
because a great number of people do in fact reason in fois way and this is so, 
presumably, because such a method of reasoning accords successfirlly with
111 Whately, Elements ٠/ Rhetoric, 59-60: There are other arguments “in which a similar 
calculation of chances will enable us to draw a Conclusion, sometime even cou n tin g  to moral 
certainty, from a combination of data which singly would have had little or no weight; e. g., if any 
one out of a hundred men throw a stone which strikes a certain object, there is but a slight 
probability, from that fact alone, that he aimed at that object; but if all the hundred threw stones 
which stnrck the some object, no one would doubt that they aimed at it. It is from such a 
combination of Argument that we infer foe existence of an intelligent Creator from the marks of 
contrivance visible in the Universe, though many of these are such as, taken singly, might well be 
conceived undersigned and accidental; but that they should all be such, is morally impossible.” 
John Davison (1777-1834), another fellow at Oriel about whom Newman writes one of his essays 
in the British Critic in 1842, also mentions proof through accumulation in his Lectures on 
Prophecy in language similar to Newman’s own, in terms of its style and substance: “These 
topics, prominent as they are when separately taken, compose only one subject of connected and 
harmonizing proof. However different foe ground and principle of reason in each of them may be, 
the effect of them is to be united, and it bears upon one and foe same point in combining to make 
up that moral evidence by which it has pleased foe Almighty to ascertain His last revelation to 
us” (19). “For though some kind of proof be incapable of accession by an extended cumulative 
reason, foe proof of religion is not ofthat nature, but one which gathers light and strength by the 
concentrated force of all its moral evidence. The whole of it, therefore, must be laid together, and 
the aggregate of the concurrent proofs will close the investigation [...] that foe indication of our 
Faith rests upon an accumulated and concurrent evidence” (23). See John Davison, Discourses ٠٨ 
Prophecy: Its Structure, Use, and Inspiration, 5th ed. (Oxford: John Henry Farker, 1845).
112 Whately, Elements ofRhetoric, Chapter 11, Sects. 3-4. Also to be noted is Whately’s inclusion 
of Testimony as a kind of Sign. This discussion begins in Section 4.
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human experience. Thnugh not syllogistic, one can use the word ‘logical’ to 
describe it.113
5 Path©s and the start of an يأو؛
The practical, persuasive, and hence rhetorical character of Newman’s concep- 
tion of Inference cannot be limited to converging probabilities in terms of 
evidences (or Signs). This is why we now turn to the more subjective element of 
Inference, which, in rhetorical terms, we refer to as pathos. For Aristotle, pathos 
refers specifically to the persuasive appeal to the audience’s emotions.^* The 
orator is meant to stir up these emotions which “so change men as to affect their 
judgments.”*** This element of pathos, however, when applied to epistemology, is 
not so much about stirring or provoking emotions in the hearer; for N e ^ a n  what 
is significant is the recognition that them are certain factors that precede any 
argument and which affect one’s judgment. These are called antecedent conside- 
rations. Both Aristotle and Newman agree about the importance of, for example, 
the ‘right frame of mind’. For Aristotle, toe orator may have a hand in influencing 
this ‘frame of mind’ by stirring emotions, but might also simply have to recognize 
and appeal to toe ‘frame of mind’ whatever it happens to be at a given time among 
a certain people. Hence, for example, toe Aristotelian orator must take into 
account toe listeners’ age and social status.*^ In what follows, 1 take toe liberty 
of expanding these factors to include toe entire subjective dimension of toe 
person or inquirer because part of Newman’s attention to toe subject includes,
113 The relationship between logie and Newman’s Informal Inference is no doubt complex. 
Walter lost has directed attention to toe seemingly contradictory tendencies in Newman’s 
Grammar in Rhetorical Thought, 92-93 and, on page 93, has interpreted it thusly: “Were logic 
equivalent to notions, in short, Newman’s fears would be well founded. But logic is not 
equivalent to notions, and once we change the meaning of logic from notional propositions in 
valid deductive relations to valid deductive relations exclusively, it is quite correct to say (as 
Newman seems to on occasion) that concrete reasoning can be consummately logical: ‘We think 
in logic, as we talk in prose, without aiming at doing so.’ In toe modern sense of logic, this is to 
say nothing more than that our reasoning Is often consistent or valid and that validity as such has 
nothing to do with the notions of which Newman speaks. Where he equates ‘logic’ with ‘notions,’ 
toe former appears simply irrelevant to informal inference.
114 Rhetoric, 1356a 13-17; 1377b 25-1378a5.
115 Rhetoric, 1378a 20.
116 This discussion is in Rhetoric, 1388b 31-1391b 8. ‘Social status’ is this author’s term for 
Aristotle’s “fortune” or “birth, wealth, power” etc. (See Rhetoric, 1388b 35-1389a).
217Newman’s Epistemology an^ Aristotelian Rhetoric —GRUYTER
but is not limited to, the emotions and prejudices based solely on age and 
status.^ This will become more clear below.
5.1 Signs and Probabilities
One upshot of a consideration of the subject is that an accumulation of evidence 
cannot be reduced to objective phenomena. For there is a subjective dimension that 
contiibutes to what sign or phenomenon is interpreted to be a piece of evidence in 
the first place. In this sense, Newman’s use of Eikota (translated, Frobabilities) 
moves well beyond Aristotle’s more objective use of the word.118 Accepting the 
empiricist critique of probability, Newman focused on the subjective dimension of 
probability as a notion in the mind, not a property within the object itself. Whether 
or not something is deemed probable depends not simply on the nature of the 
object itself, but on the ‘principles, views, and wishes’ (U. s .,لوو  or expectations of 
the individual subject. A proof of “converging probabilities”, then, is constituted by 
both Signs and Frobabilities (here understood as what one thinks to be likely).
We might recall that, in the tenth of his University Sermons, Newman 
juxtaposes evidence (٠Sêmeia) with “principles, views, and wishes” (Eikota). The 
section in the Grammar expositing the action of the Illative Sense at the start of an 
inquiry is dominated by a discussion of Eikota (though he does not use this term 
in the Grammar) or first principles in the mostgeneral sense ofthe word: namely, 
all those things, ideas, expectations, prejudices, dispositions, and principles, 
which one carries within oneself before an inquiry begins.*^ In short, the Eikota 
refer, for Newman, to those dimensions within the subject that have the potential 
to increasingly (or decreasingly) dispose someone to accept, believe, or assent to
17ل For Newman, it is the general ‘state of mind’ of the listener that the rhetor has to take into 
eonsideration. For example, while reviewing a draft of an article seeking to defend the verity of 
the shrine at Loreto -  the veritableness of which Newman would become less convinced -  
Newman says that in order to make it more “rhetorically convincing,” the author has to make 
sure that the argument is “adapted to the state of men’s minds.” See L. ٠٠, XIV, 260 (to h M. 
Capes, 19 April 1851). In this context of discussing what is ‘rhetorically convincing’, Newman also 
mentions the necessity of highlighting the antecedent probability for something (or at least that 
something is notimprobable).
118 McKerrow shows that for Whately a concept such as “probability” referred to an individual’s 
knowledge ofthe event, not to events themselves (as it did for Aristotle). Cf. Ray E. McKerrow, 
“Richard Whately on the Nature of Human Knowledge in Relation to Ideas of His Contempora- 
ries,” Journal ofthe History ofldeas 42 (1981), 453-454.
119 According to Newman, for example, toe rhetorical strength of Kingsley’s allegations against him 
lies in playing on the prejudice that Newman was a papist while an Anglican. See. L. D., XXI, 90-91.
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certain truths.120 The more disposed someone is to accepting some such truth, the 
less evidence wili be necessary before the individual is persuaded. Naturally, foe 
converse is also true. For Newman, then, Eikota and Sêmeia, Frobabilities and 
Signs, or expectation and evidence, should not be understood as two objective 
categories under which foe world’s phenomena fall. Rather, they should be 
understood as two impulses in the same argument -  or two dimensions in foe 
process by which one comes to knowledge.121 “Mere probability proves nothing, 
mere facts persuade no one.”122 The role of foe Illative Sense at the start of an 
inquiry is to acquire the right starting-points or suppositions that will allow for 
further and fruitful inquiry; similarly, the Illative Sense also dismisses other 
suppositions that would hinder the inquiry and lead us towards the “irrelevant 
and absurd.”*^ As foe traditional Aristotelian rhetor appeals to foe audience’s 
emotions (or more generally, foe listeners’ presuppositions) so as to deploy the 
argument more effectively, so the Illative Sense equips the thinlting subject with a 
capacity to accept certain first principles and starting points by which subsequent 
evidence can be interpreted with greater import.
5.2 Antecedent considerations at the start of an inquiry
Discussing foe role of foe Illative Sense at the start of an inquiry (Ch. 9, Sect. 3, 
No. 2), Newman naturally opts to discuss antecedent reasoning. Antecedent prob- 
abilities are used with frequency and versatility: to argue that a criminal’s 
reputation increases the likelihood of foe accusation leveled against him; to argue 
for or against miracles; to convert people to Christianity; or to draw theological 
conclusions. In short, antecedent probabilities are salient in foe outcome of a 
dispute, even though they, by themselves, do not prove any given case.*2^  Newman, 
in his understanding of antecedent probability, is indebted to Whately.
120 Anther way 0 ؛ expressing this is antecedent considerations, or “everything that is con- 
sciously or subconsciously in the mind when tee enquiry begins.” See ?hilip Flanagan, Newman, 
Faith and the Believer (London: Sands & Co. Ltd., 1946), 78.
121 Newman sees tee two sides as playing a complementary role with regard to each other: 
“Reason, weighing evidence only, or arguing from external experience, is counter to Faith; but, 
admitting the legitimate influence and logical import of the moralfeelings, it concurs with it.” My 
emphasis. (Í7. s., 195).
.مم2.,أآ.ك 122
123 G. A., 376.
124 G. A., 381-383. Esp. p. 383: “Facts cannot he proved by presumptions, yet it is remarkable that in 
cases where nothing stronger than presumption was even professed, scientific men have sometimes 
acted as if they thought this kind of argument, taken by itself, decisive ofa fact which was in debate.”
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Whately, in his Elements ofRhetoric, takes Aristotle’s division between arguments 
by Signs (٠Sêmeia) and Probabilities (Eikos) and, in his own terms, describes the 
former as arguments from effects to conditions and toe latter as arguments from 
causes to effect, or, respectively, aposteriori and apriori arguments.^ The former 
refers to an accumulation of evidences or effects which tend toward a condition 
which accounts for them; this coincides with the paradigmatic method of 
Newman’s Informal Inference. Arguments from cause to effect (or a priori argu- 
ments), according to Whately, entail arguments from antecedent probability, and 
serve as a counterpart to arguments from Signs. According to these a prion 
arguments or antecedent probabilities, a given set of circumstances serves to 
account for (or be the cause هو  a certain effect; the circumstances, as a result, 
elicit an expectation ofthat effect.
The difference between the two can be illustrated by Whately’s own examples 
of a murderer.126 It should not, then, come as a surprise that Newman himself, in 
toe material prepared for his introduction to the Prench edition of his University 
Sermons, uses toe same example of a murder.^ The a posteriori argument that 
accumulates evidences goes something like this: ‘He had blood on his clothing; 
he was not with us when toe crime happened, etc [...]’ Herc, toe facts (effects) will 
he explained, if toe accused man committed toe crime.128 The a priori argument 
according to antecedent probability, however, runs something like this: ‘he hated 
the deceased; he had an interest in the latter’s death; he was a robber.’ Here, toe 
facts (causes) such as that the man was a robber, explain (or account for) the 
crime (the effect). As Flanagan explains, aposteriori arguments that accumulate 
evidence prove more or less perfectly, according to their strength; toe a priori 
arguments cannot prove anything, but they do “conffrm a proof when evidence is 
produced, or make a doubtful or probable proof more probabfe.”*^ The two kinds 
of argument together build up a case in such a way that the stronger toe 
antecedent probability, the less evidence is needed to convict an individual of
12ق Whately, Elements ofRhetoric (1830 ed.), 48-51.
126 Whately, Elements ofRhetoric (1830 ed.), 44-51.
127 Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford between A. D. 1826 and 1843, ed. 
James D. Earnest and Gerard Tracey (Oxford: Oxford University ?ress, 2006), 241. Henry Tristram, 
“Cardinal Newman’s Theses de Fide and his Froposed Introduction to fee French Transiation of 
fee University Sermons,” Gregorianum 18 (1937): 252-255; Newman mentions fee motif briefly in 
u. S., 264. Cf. Flanagan, Newman, 68-69; Cf. Geertjan Zuijdwegt, “Between Rome and Infidelity: 
Newman’s Essay on Development and its Early Critics, 1845-1847” (unpublished Masters dis- 
sertation, Faculty of Theology, K. u. Leuven, 2010), 59-62; Cf. Two Essays on Biblical and 
Ecclesiastical Miracles. (London: Longmans, Green. Co., 1907), 14.
128 Flanagan, Newman, 68-9.
129 Flanagan, Newman, 69.
GRUYTER220 —  Andrew Meszaros
belief, despite the fact that there can exist a certain amount of evidence which is 
fixed and sufficient to convince everybody.^ Both Whately and Newman apply 
this correlative method of argument to the question of Christianity, where the 
preparatoty nature of a prion (antecedent probability) arguments serve as a 
foundation for their aposteriori counterparts. Here is Whately at length:
The antecedent probability that a revelation should be given to man, and that it should be 
established by miracles, all would allow to be, considered by itself, in the absence of strong 
direct testimony, utterly insufficient to establish the conclusion. On the other hand, miracles 
considered abstractedly, as represented to have occurred without any occasion or reason for 
them being assigned, carry with them such a strong intrinsic improbability as could not be 
wholly surmounted even by such evidence as would fully establish any other matters of fact. 
But tire evidences of the former class, however inefficient alone towards the establishment of 
the conclusion, have very great weight in preparing tire mind for receiving the other 
arguments; which, again, though they would be listened to with prejudice if not so supported, 
will then be allowed their just weight-^*
Though it is not our place here to make a comparative analysis, it should be noted 
that Newman^ argument in the Grammar justifying certitude in relation to Chris- 
tianity follows, generally, the justificatory pattern of Whately in its synthesis of 
both a priori and a posteriori arguments.ص  To put it briefly, Newman’s proof by 
evidences is presented to those “whose minds are properly prepared for it.”133 Such 
a preparation begins, for Newman, with an experience of the acts of conscience 
which ultimately leads one to expect a revelation.*3* This expectation entails a 
whole host of presuppositions or first principles -  such as that man is not sufficient 
for his own happiness -  upon which the subsequent evidences for Christianity can
130 Flanagan, 69.
131 Whately, Elements ofRhetoric (180و ed.), 113-114.
132 For a comparison ofWhately’s and Newman’s respective theories of belief and the rhetorical 
argumentation behind it, see Zuijdwegt, “Richard Whatety’s Influence on John Henry Newman,” 
91-93. Zuijdwegt further points out the inconsistency between Whately’s apologetical theory 
(manifested in the above-quoted passage) and his actual apologetical praxis (manifested in, for 
example, his “Easy Lessons on Christian Evidences”) which relied almost exclusively on 
evidences (See p. 93).
133G. Æ, 415.
134 G. A., 404-405; 423. Emphasis is put on ultimately because Newman only begins with 
conscience but methodically paints the portrait of a character who, sensitive to conscience, 
exhibits a plethora of notions and beliefs that all hang together: responsibility, burden, and 
punishment; providence; that one is not sufficient for one’s own happiness; that prayer is part of 
Natural Religion.
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be stacked.135 Insisting on these presuppositions (for why “attempt to prove a 
second proposition to those who do not admit the first”? ),^  ^ ١٧٥١^  attempts to 
prove the س  of a Christian revelation as demonstrable, albeit not irresistible.^ 
The same model of argument imbues Newman’s Essay on Development wherein 
antecedent probabilities are e s t a b l i s h e d i n  order that they may be “fulfilled” by 
historical evidence.13® Antecedent argument plays a role even in Newman’s ana- 
lysis of emotions and sentiments; passions and affections, for example, imply their 
objects.^ Indeed, to understand N em an’s thoughts on the ommunication of, 
and acceptance of, any idea, ?robabilities (Eikota) must be placed alongside any 
and all Evidence {Sêmeia).u0 “11 ؛ have brought out one truth in anything 1 have 
written, 1 consider it to be tire importance ofantecedentprobability in conviction. It 
is how you convert factory girls as well as philosophers.”*** While the coincidence 
of probabilities and facts constitutes tire form of the argument itself, whether or not 
one actually apprehends something as ‘probable’ to begin with is, in large part, 
dependent on the subject’s disposition. What we learn from Nevmran, then, is that 
logos or argumentation never stands alone; its very structure presupposes pathos 
(as the concept is expanded here so as to include all antecedent conrrictions and 
moral dispositions).
5.3 The relation$hip between moral dispo$؛tlon and antecedent 
probability
Antecedent considerations, coupled with one’s moral disposition, affect the per- 
sonal preparation necessary for the encounter with any argument. When it comes to 
presenting the Gospel, Newman writes, “If we are to convert souls savingly they
135 The summary opposite of these is found in Newman’s description of the beliefs ofa “civilized 
age.” SeeG.A, 416.
136 G. A , 416.
13? G. A , 410.
138 Antecedent arguments are everywhere found in toe Essay on Development They are invoked 
for toe sake of expecting developments in general, and for toe sake o^articular doctrines. See, in 
particular, Dev., Ch. 11. Sect. 111., 2. See also Robin Selby, The Principle ofReserve in the Writings ٠/  
John Henry Cardinal Newman (Oxford: Oxford University ?ress, 1975), 75-88, esp. pp. 83-86.
139 Dev., Ch. 1. Sect. 11., 7. Thomas Vargish, Newman: The Contemplation of Mind (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1970), 59: “Newman’s position is again toe antithesis of Freud’s. For Newman, 
guilt and fear, desire and love, are not chiefly sources of illusion but chiefly sources of 
knowledge.”
140 u. S., 224: “a reaching forward of the mind” toward evidence or facts.
141 L. D., XV, 381.
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must have the due preparation of heart.”*** Using the wrong kind of argument 
(e. g., an abstract argument in order to establish God’s attributes) “against men who 
are unprepared personallyfor the question” will simply lead to a “land of shadows, 
‘where the light is as darkness’.”143 Persons must be prepared for any inquiry into 
the truth of any matter. For Newman, such preparation is increasingly necessary as 
one moves away from mathematical and abstract matters to concrete and religious 
questions. Such preparation requires both a certain kind of moral disposition -  or 
what Ne™ an in the twelfth of his University Sermons called the “right state of 
heart” ־  and the acquisition of certain first principles.144
A proper moral disposition, for Newman, is attained by the adherence to 
one’s conscience, ft is only with a sense of being responsible for something or to 
someone that the gravitas of religious matters comes to the surface. Conscience 
does this primafacie by its sense of duty, but also by furnishing the mind with a 
sense of urgency and a sense of expectation, especially in religious matters. 
Newman, here, is heavily indebted to Joseph Butler (1692-1752) and his Analogy 
ofReligion.145 As to the sense of urgency, Newman quotes Butler who writes that 
the inquiring parties must be
as much in earnest about religion, as about their temporal affairs, capable of being 
convinced, on real evidence, that there is a God who governs the world, and feel themselves 
to be of a moral nature and accountable creatures.146
Dovetailing this sense of earnestness in ascertaining the truth is conscience’s, 
and generally the moral disposition’s, effect on one’s expectations. “And what 
he thinks likely, depends surely on nothing else than the general state of mind,
142 ¿״٠٠  XXV, 3.
143 My emphasis. G. Æ, 314.
144 u. S., 234. One should be aware of the development of Newman’s thought on this idea. It can 
be said that the early Newman placed more emphasis on the moral disposition than me late 
Newman. The later Newman, writing the Introduction to his University Sermons, is, according to 
Flanagan, for example, more aware of the insufficiency of antecedent probabilities than me 
Newman at the time of the Sermons themselves. Cf. Flanagan, Newman, 71. Although conscience 
is a constant starting point for Newman, even (and especially!) in the Grammar, Newman is less 
likely, as his thought matures, to attribute culpability to the person with whom he disagrees. 
Such a shift can be attributed to his experience with his good friend and empiricist William 
Froude. Nevertheless, in 1871 still, Newman wrote, in a letter, that his Grammar is meant “to show 
mat a right moral state of mind germinates or even generates good intellectual principles” (L. ٠., 
XXV, 28م ). Cf. Merrigan, ClearHeads and Holy Hearts, 39n45.
145 Apo. , 119  ;11 -م .
146 Quoted in G. A., 320. Newman’s quotation is taken from Butler’s Analogy ofReligion (1836 ed.) 
278. Conscience’s apprehension of God is discussed in Merrigan, ClearHeads andHolyHeartSy 37-40.
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the state of his eonvictions, feeiings, tastes, and wishes.”147 What is a probabil- 
ityfor one person,
depends ٠٨ his moral temperament. A good and a bad man will think very different things 
probable. In the judgment of a rightly disposed mind, objects are desirable and attainable 
which irreligious men will consider to be but fancies.*^
The key link between moral charaeter and anteeedent probability lies in the 
relationship between the apprehension of fundamental truths delivered to us by 
conseience, on the one hand, and the interpretation that these truths effeet in 
one’s encounter with something(s) or event(s), on the other. In the previous 
quotation, this relationship is expressed in terms of the relationship between the 
desirable and the attainable. An object is seen to be more attainable -  more 
probable -  when there is a desire or affection for it. This psychological pattern 
ought سآ  be mistaken for the erroneous notion that the verity of something is 
justiffed by some wishftrl thinlting. There are two reasons for this cautionary note. 
First, neither a desire for something, nor an antecedent probability that some- 
thing is true, makes that thing true and Newman -  especially the more mature 
Newman -  recognizes this. Secondly, this relationship between conscience and 
the probable -  or the moral disposition and one’s expectations -  is not limited to 
what is desirable, but also extends to any psychological phenomena, including 
responsibility and accountability. For one is also more likely to hold the verity of 
the more severe doctrine of Judgment to be more probable, as the case may be, if 
one is more in touch with one’s conscience.^ Hence we cannot accuse Newman 
of reducing the efficacy of an argument to tire audience’s moral state because 
Newman affirms that theprocess by which one arrives at a conclusion, despite all 
other personal, moral, and emotional factors that may contribute to that process, 
still has within itself a rational trajectory
According to Newman, then, tire individual’s moral disposition is one fun- 
damental aspect of his or her preparation for any inquiry, but more prominently 
so in contingent and concrete, moral and religious matters. The one who is not 
self-reflective, who is aloof from moral self-awareness, may consider a religious 
subject “carelessly, captiously, or with indifference.” On the other hand, one who 
is conscientious may press “upon the conscience [...] that we are playing with
147 tt. S., 226.
148 u. s., 191.
1هو  Dev., Ch. 1. Sect. II., 7.
150 Newman dees not reduce the criteria necessary for knowledge to one’s moral disposition. He
affirms that one can account for the ratiocinative method involved. See G. A., 320.
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edged tools” so as to truly “ascertain what the truth is.”151 Meekness, humility, 
and “teachableness are qualities of mind necessary for arriving at the truth in any 
subject, and in religious matters as well as others.”*^ ‘Obedience to our con- 
science [...] is the way to know the Truth.”153
In sum, then, one’s moral disposition affects one’s expectations, hopes, and 
‘view’ of the world, and hence, plays a distinct role in antecedent probabilities. 
Antecedent probabilities, in turn, can be so rooted in an individual consciousness 
that it becomes an active principle which guides inquiries. The presuppositions 
with which one approaches any inquiry effect what is deemed to be a “reason־ 
able” conclusion, and what is not. Whether or not one accepts the legitimacy of 
“doctrinal development,” for example, for Newman, depends, in large part, on 
the presuppositions, the antecedent probabilities, and the moral character of the 
individual inquiring into it. Sillem summarizes Newman’s thoughts well here:
Newman agreed that we must follow the a priori laws of logic when we are thinking in the 
abstract. When, however, a man is seeking the truth about matters of fact, especially in the 
realms of metaphysics and religion, the outcome of his researches depends in a large 
measure on his moral character and disposition, and on his being wholly and dispassion- 
ately dedicated to the truth as to a good higher than himself-^
l^restingly, in a letter written in 1847, Newman explains that when he wrote, in 
his University Sermons, the phrases, “mere unstable Reason” and “mere Reason”, 
he was referring to “reason ؛٨٠  under the guidance of conscience.”155 We can infer 
that reason under the guidance ofconscience belongs to the one who is prepared. 
This, of course, impacts the way in which theologians conceive of apologetics and 
the credibility of the Christian faith.
6 Conclusion
A tradition of Aristotelian rhetorical theoiy -  stemming from Aristotle’s own 
Rhetoric and developed in Whately’s Elements of Rhetoric ־  has been shown to 
have had a clear influence on Newman’s epistemology. Mom precisely, I have 
shown that the classical notions of Aristotelian ethos, logos, and pathos corres-
152 Parochial and Plain Sermons, Vlll, 113. Hereafter  ^ p. s.
153 P. S. /, 146.
154 P.N., 1, 66. Cf. Í7.5., 84.
155 I. D., XII, 30. Newman writes this in the ccntext of expressing thoughts on a new edition of 
his sermons about to be translated into French.
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pond respective!y to Newman’s appeal to the prudent man, his theo!׳y of Informal 
and Natural Inferenee, and the significanee Newman attaehes to personal moral 
disposition and its effect on antecedent probability.
This rhetorical dimension of Newman’s epistemic principles helps shed light 
on the highly concrete and personal nature with which Newman envisions any 
approach to, and communication of, the truth, religious or othe™rise. This way of 
argument becomes significant for Newman not only in his defence of the Christian 
religion, but also of the particular doctrinal developments within tire Roman 
Catholic tradition. Applied to theological Tradition, or the transmission of the 
mystery of Christ, the Rhetoric -  and Newman’s appeal to it -  substantiate the 
quite obvious, but oftentimes overlooked truth, that the content of the faith is 
transmitted, not by books and arguments, but by people, their actions and habits; 
and that faith is transmitted, not to an impersonal and unembodied Reason, but 
to concrete human persons. By reflecting on the Aristotelian rhetorical rationality 
developed by Newman, one can begin to see Newman’s apologetical and pastoral 
application of it. Reflecting on this rhetorical rationality sets the stage for further 
development of a ‘rhetorical Christology’. Newman explains, for example, that 
discipleship begins when one is persuaded by the “rhetoric of His [Christ’s] divine 
Life.”156 Christ, here, is the great rhetor, whose perfect virtue renders the authority 
of his character (i.e., his ethos) insurpassable; whose words and actions con- 
stitute the best argument (i.e., logos); and whose message is tailored to his 
hearers (i. e., pathos) such that it bears fruit among the seekers and those who 
are prepared for it.
156 L. D., XXVI, 232.
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